

# Multi-Theorem Preprocessing NIZKs from Lattices

Sam Kim and David J. Wu Stanford University

NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 





 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 



NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 









 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 

Verifier(x)

NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 





Prover(x, w)



Accept / Reject

NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 






 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 


#### **Requirements:**


1. Completeness

Accept

NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 








 $\mathsf{Prover}(x \notin \mathcal{L})$ 


#### **Requirements:**

- 1. Completeness
- 2. Soundness


Reject


NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 





Verifier(x)







#### **Requirements:**

- 1. Completeness
- 2. Soundness
- 3. Zero-Knowledge

NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 







???

 $Sim(x \in \mathcal{L})$ 


#### **Requirements:**

- 1. Completeness
- 2. Soundness
- 3. Zero-Knowledge


Natural to ask: Can we have "one-shot" ZK proofs?

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NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 



 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 




Accept / Reject


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NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 

 $\pi$ 



 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 



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Work with weaker models:

- Random Oracle Model
- CRS Model

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Soundness + Zero-Knowldge implies Efficient Decision Algorithm

Work with weaker models:

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- CRS Model

This Work: We focus on the CRS Model (or preprocessing model)

Constructions for all of <u>NP</u>? (w/ efficient provers, reusable CRS, publicly verifiable, ...)

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Constructions for all of <u>NP</u>?

(w/ efficient provers, reusable CRS, publicly verifiable, ...)

- 1. Trapdoor Permutations [FLS90, ...]
- 2. Pairings [GOS06, ...]
- 3. Indistinguishability Obfuscation [SW14, ...]

Still no construction from LWE.

- NIZK for specific languages [PV08, APS18, RSS18, ...]

## **Our Results**


1. Construct NIZK for NP in preprocessing model from LWE


# **Our Results**

- 1. Construct NIZK for NP in preprocessing model from LWE
- 2. Show how to do preprocessing
  - Blind Homomorphic Signatures (BHS)

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
- 1. Construct NIZK for NP in preprocessing model from LWE
- 2. Show how to do preprocessing
  - Blind Homomorphic Signatures (BHS)
- 3. Applications to MPC







NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 


Preprocessing: Independent of <u>statement</u> or <u>witness</u>








Prover




















NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 




Verifier

Prover








NP Language  $\mathcal{L}$ 





Easier to construct: follows from OWF [DMP88, ...]





























































 $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{pk}}(f, \mathbf{y'}, \sigma^*_{\mathbf{x}, f})$ 

**Unforgeability?** 



**Compactness:** signature size  $|\sigma^*_{\mathbf{x},f}|$  independent of  $|\mathbf{x}|$ 



**Context-Hiding**:  $\sigma^*_{\mathbf{x},f}$  not reveal any more info about  $\mathbf{x}$ 

 $\mathsf{pp} = \mathbf{C}_1, \dots, \mathbf{C}_N, \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$ 

$$\mathsf{pp} = \mathbf{C}_1, \dots, \mathbf{C}_N, \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$$

 $\mathsf{pk} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{td}_{\mathbf{A}}$ 

$$\mathsf{pp} = \mathbf{C}_1, \dots, \mathbf{C}_N, \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$$

$$\mathsf{pk} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$$
  
 $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{td}_{\mathbf{A}}$ 

Signature for  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$  consists of short matrices  $\sigma_{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{R}_1, \dots, \mathbf{R}_N \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$  such that

$$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_1 + x_1 \cdot \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{C}_1$$
$$\vdots$$
$$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_N + x_N \cdot \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{C}_N$$

$$\mathsf{pp} = \mathbf{C}_1, \dots, \mathbf{C}_N, \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$$

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
$$\mathsf{pk} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$$
  
 $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{td}_{\mathbf{A}}$ 

Signature for  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$  consists of short matrices  $\sigma_{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{R}_1, \dots, \mathbf{R}_N \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$  such that


$$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_1 + x_1 \cdot \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{C}_1$$
  
$$\vdots$$
  
$$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{GSW}} \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_f + f(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{C}_f$$

 $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_N + x_N \cdot \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{C}_N$ 


Need extra step for context-hiding




 $\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)$ 




Verifier(x)






 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_w}$ 





 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_w}$ 


 $1 = f_x(w), \ \sigma^*_{\underline{w}, f_x}$ 




 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Verifier}(x) \\ \mathsf{pk} \end{array}$ 

$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$

 $1 = f_x(w), \ \sigma^*_{\underline{w}, f_x}$ 




 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_w}$ 




pk

$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$

 $1 = f_x(w), \ \sigma^*_{\underline{w}, f_x}$ 




 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_w}$ 




 $\frac{\text{Verifier}(x)}{\text{Verify}_{\mathsf{pk}}(f_x, 1, \sigma^*_{w, f_x})}$ 

$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$




#### 1. HS Correctness implies NIZK Completeness

$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$




### 2. HS Unforgeability implies NIZK Soundness


$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$





#### 3. HS Context-Hiding implies NIZK Zero-Knowledge

$$f_x(w) = \mathcal{R}(x, w)$$












 $\mathsf{Enc}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C} \\ \mathsf{Dec}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{M} \\$ 




 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_{\pmb{k}}}$ 




 $\mathsf{Enc}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C} \\ \mathsf{Dec}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{M} \\ \mathsf{}$ 




 $g_{x,\mathsf{ct}}(\mathbf{k}) = \mathcal{R}(x,\mathsf{Dec}(\mathbf{k},\mathsf{ct}))$ 





 $g_{x,\mathsf{ct}}(\mathbf{k}) = \mathcal{R}(x,\mathsf{Dec}(\mathbf{k},\mathsf{ct}))$ 







 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_{\pmb{k}}}$ 









 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_{\pmb{k}}}$ 






## Homomorphic Signatures to NIZK?




 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_{\pmb{k}}}$ 

 $\pi_2 = (\mathsf{ct}_2, \sigma_2^*)$ 




 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Verifier}(x) \\ \mathsf{pk} \end{array}$ 

## Homomorphic Signatures to NIZK?



 $\pi_3 = (\mathsf{ct}_3, \sigma_3^*)$ 




 $\frac{\mathsf{Prover}(x,w)}{\sigma_{\pmb{k}}}$ 


 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Verifier}(x) \\ \mathsf{pk} \end{array}$ 

**Generically**: Either have to use many rounds or non-black use (costly)

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
Let's just construct directly!






Receiver

 $\sigma_m$ 




**Blind Signatures?** 





Receiver

 $\sigma_m$ 



Blind Signatures? Blind Homomorphic Signatures (BHS)







## **Blind Homomorphic Signatures**

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
Signer



### **Blind Homomorphic Signatures**




## **Blind Homomorphic Signatures**




#### Must account for:

- Arbitrary abort attacks
- Maliciously generated signatures
- Guarantee context-hiding even when signer has signing key



### **GMW Compiler:**


Semi-Honest to Malicious security



#### **GMW Compiler:**

Semi-Honest to Malicious security

At every step, each party proves that they are following protocol.




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At every step, each party proves that they are following protocol.

Semi-honest + NIZK = Malicious

Preserves round complexity



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Semi-Honest to Malicious security


At every step, each party proves that they are following protocol.

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Semi-honest + NIZK w/preprocessing = Malicious

Preprocessing step done once




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Semi-Honest to Malicious security

At every step, each party proves that they are following protocol.

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Semi-honest + NIZK w/preprocessing = Malicious

- Preprocessing step done once

**Good**: Rely on lattices + small communication size

1. LWE-based NIZK arguments in preprocessing (multi-theorem)

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### Thanks!